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Disaster of the past decade reminded that Ayutthaya province of Thailand has been commonly facing with flood every 
year. The study focuses on how to enable low-income residents to mitigate their financial risk in flood loss through   
neighborhood microinsurance. The results revealed that low-income residents have been suffering on diminished 
income and damaged house. It causes them lack of financial liquidity and forces them borrow money from 
moneylenders. Microinsurance is one of financial disaster instruments for protecting low-income residents against flood 
losses. As results, respondents are willing to join in microinsurance program, as long as it is combined with 
microfinance. Meanwhile, enhancing neighborhood relationships are the fundamental way to achieve the ultimate goals 
of the study. 
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1. Introduction 
 
   While a number of countries are focusing on economic development, the world is facing with natural 
disaster. As climate changing, all countries of the world are facing with natural disasters, which more severe 
in term of frequency increasing and severity level than the past of decade1). In 2008, 1.5 millions of Thai 
residents (2.5 percent of total population) were victims of flood. Picture on the right hand showed that nearly 
40 % of land area are flood risk area, especially in northeast where 20 percent of families were low-income 
families. 
  As a point of flood loss, low-income residents in flood prone area have to handle with financial risk because 
of flood losses. Financial options of low-income families are usually narrower and more climate-sensitive 
than another social class. Increasing attention in disaster risk management in term of finance is nowadays 
paid to microinsurance as risk transfer mechanisms for low-income families. It can play in indemnitor role 
for compensating loss, assisting restoration activities, and improving families’ risk bearing. The study 
focuses on answering the questions what low-income residents needs to mitigate their flood loss through 
flood microinsurance and focuses on identifying the crucial factors influencing on decision making of the 
low-income residents to join in neighborhood flood microinsurance policy. The expected outcome of the 
study is to enable low-income residents to participate in neighborhood flood microinsurance. 
   The daily life of many Thais is a permanent emergency as flood is the common hazard occurring every 
year. Flood can be interpreted as the extreme situation when compare with everyday condition, which it 
make residents in flooded area suffer in both diminished mental health and physical loss on their property. 
Disaster makes evident that the low-income residents are vulnerable because they are lack of financial 
capacity to handle with any cost of risks especially unexpected risk2). In Peru, the statistical data of dropped 
consumption phenomenon caused by disaster during 2000 to 2005 revealed that first quarter of poorest group 
dropped their consumption by 3.8 percent, while the least poor group in the top quarter had consumption 
dropped only 1.2 percent3). Seemingly, disaster does not only impact on vulnerable residents during it is 
occurring, but also disaster victims had been suffering from financial loss after disaster occurred.  
  The scholars mentioned that risk financing approaches and its instruments can be the tool to resolve this 
problem. It can be categorized into four approaches of financial risk management, which are non-market risk 
sharing, market risk transfer, inter-temporal risk spreading and finance self-supporting as illustrated in Table 
1. The study focuses on market risk transfer and finance self-supporting. An insurance approach based on 
market risk transfer is related actions consist with three main means; responding to the adverse effects of 
－265－
2 
climate change, alongside financial funding and technology transfer weather-related disaster4). It can enhance 
financial flexibility to flood shocks and provide an opportunity to spread and transfer risk, which can provide 
incentives for risk reduction and prevention to private sector take response action5). Meanwhile, a number of 
scholars stated that the “finance trinity as savings, credit, and insurance” could become an alternative option 
for finance self-supporting6).  
 
 2. Role of Microinsurance for Assisting Financial liquidity in Flood Loss 
 
   Based on the theoretical concept of disaster risk, individual disaster risk is assessed by a function of 
relation between the hazard times vulnerability divided by their capability. Disaster risk financing 
approaches is subject to develop financial instruments for enhancing financial capability, which can increase 
disaster risk bearing. 
   Traditionally, a number of risk financing instruments are available for assisting disaster victims to have 
better financial liquidity. The risk financing instruments can be categorized into four categories as shown in 
Table 1. The first, non-market risk sharing is defined as risk is transferred among victims and non-victims 
over market agreements of trading risk which means non-victims obtain disaster risk without a return 
statement. For example, government is obligated to play in a role of disaster relief provider for helping 
disaster victims after a disaster occurred7). The second is market risk transfer, which can be defined as risk of 
clients transferred among clients based on market condition. The example of market risk transferring 
instrument are disaster insurance and reinsurance, microinsurance service and catastrophe bond. The third, 
inter-temporal risk spreading is financial 
services requesting clients to make saving 
account with the institution. In practice, the 
term is pointed more narrowly like micro-
credit and micro-saving that identify 
themselves as “microfinance institutions” 
(MFIs) 9). The fourth focuses on Finance 
Self-Supporting classified into six financial 
options such as reducing household 
consumption, drawing upon savings either 
in the form of cash or non-cash assets, and 
borrowing money from moneylenders8). 
   In short, each of disaster risk financing 
approaches has strengths and weakness. 
Only one instrument cannot make cost 
efficiency and contribute productivity. Non-
market risk sharing as disaster relief is 
unsustainable approaches for solving the 
diversity of economical impacts in long-
term planning. Because it directly push 
burden from affected residents to another 
supporter such as donor and government, 
which means tax will be paid for helping 
affected residents from disaster, instead of 
using for another development project.  
  On the other hand, a number of case 
studies related to microfinance institution 
(MIFs) have been shown inability to 
meeting with their post-disaster services and 
mechanisms requested by their clients. 
Seemingly, financial self-supporting and 
market risk transfer defined as 
microinsurance tend to be sustainable 
financial approaches for disaster risk 
management in long-term planning. 
 
Table 1: Risk Financing Approaches and Its Instruments 
Approaches  Examples of instruments  
1. Non-market risk 
sharing  
Disaster relief provided by government, NGO and 
donors 
2. Market risk 
transfer  
Insurance and reinsurance, Micro-insurance and 
Catastrophe bond 
3. Inter-temporal 
risk spreading  
Contingent credit (financial market instrument), 
Reserve fund, and Microfinance both Microcredit 
and Micro-savings 
4. Finance Self-
Supporting 
Six financial options facing low-income 
households in a crisis  
- Reducing household consumption  
- Making distress sales of physical assets, 
including livestock  
- Sending family members to search for work in 
less-affected areas  
- Withdrawing upon their savings 
- Borrowing money  
- Using remittances  
Source: Adapted from Hochrainer and colleague (2007), Parker and 
Nagarajan (2000) 
 
 
Figure 1: The Main Functions of Risk Transfer 
 
Source: Economics of Climate Adaptation Working Group (2010) 
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   As a viewpoint of disaster scholars, flood microinsurance is a unique type of insurance with affordable 
premium based on between the concepts of risk transfer and risk pool among clients by offering insurance 
policy. It primarily aims to insure the low-income residents, especially those in the informal sector, who 
tends to be underserved by commercial bank and social insurance schemes. OECD states the benefits of 
insurance that insurance has a dual role with respect to mitigation measure. Access to insurance payouts can 
decrease the net adverse impact of climatic events on policyholders. At the same time, insurance is also an 
instrument for convincing residents to take mitigation measures aimed at reducing climate risks9).  
   Figure 1 illustrates the benefit and costs of risk transfer. Risk transfer can smooth the costs of climate 
events to individuals by trading off premiums10). In disaster risk transfer market approach, households have to 
pay in the equal amount of money as premium price for house restoration cost whether actual losses in some 
period may although be lower than premium. But in the severe disaster, households are ensured that insurer 
will compensate their losses although it will be over the amount of paid premium. As premium price is 
charged by expected loss plus a deductible cost for risk distribution. Pool premiums are used to compensate 
client losses in cycle of limiting cross-subsidies between policyholders. According to premium design, group 
and individual insurance patterns of insurance scheme are one factor influencing on premium price. 
Neighborhood flood microinsurance can keep administrative cost lower than individual insurance scheme, as 
distributed transaction pattern is group-by-group damage assessment rather than one case-by-case. Moreover, 
this scheme can reduce the potential of only high-risk person purchasing the insurance by requiring of group 
membership qualification. The greatest of group-membership qualification is that it tends to get membership 
faster than individual insurance. In the large-scale viewpoint, it will be benefit to increase likelihood to 
create community based disaster prevention and mitigation programs supporting finance by micro-insurance 
program. However, willingness to join in group insurance scheme is relied on strong relationship among 
group members. 
 
 3. Research Methodology 
 
   The study methodology is designed based on qualitative analysis using observation technique and in-depth 
interview technique with sample fraction of the population in Tambon Phukaothong. A study area, Tambon 
Phukaothong, is selected as it is the most venerable area in to be flood caused by location located near flood 
detention area. While surrounding area is protected by water detention project. In term of sampling design, 
surveys sampling design is based on stratified random sampling method. Two attributes for categorization 
respondents are respondent’s characters of house construction and household income classified by income 
poverty line and average of household income as shown in Figure 3. Considering with two attributes, pillar 
house construction can protect owner from 1.5 meters of average flood water level, while non-pillar house 
owners will suffer from flood in every water level of flood. On the contrary, household income will be 
mainly factor dominating in choosing the type of financial options in an emergency. As surveys, a total 
number of respondents are twelve households as illustrated in Table 2.  
   In the study area, there are not much different household characteristics between the resident themselves, 
because most of them are both relative and neighbors. Most of Thais in rural area divide inherited big land 
lot into small piece of land for sharing land among their relatives. Therefore, the twelve respondents living 
far from each others can completely express almost household characteristics of the study area.  
 
 
Figure 3: Stratified Random Sampling Method  (THB = Baht) 
Source: By Authors 
Note:  Household income is classified into 3 ratio based on poverty line 
and average income per month 
 
Figure 2:  study area located near flood detention area 
 
Source: Department of Public Works and Town & Country 
Planning, Kingdom of Thailand (2004) 
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4. Descriptive Results 
 
  They are many kinds of mitigation measures 
taken by local residents in the study area, 
which can be divided into three mitigation 
measures taken by residents in the study area; 
mitigation related house construction, 
preparing sandbags, boat and any staff for 
coping with flood, and moving any staff to a 
higher floor. However, many households 
cannot finance themselves in recovery 
process. 
   The study focuses on financial options 
which residents could manage their risk of 
loss after flood occurred. As Thailand’s 
market risk transferring instrument in 
financial disaster dose not exit, six financial 
options of self-financial instrument mentioned 
in Table 1 have became the first option for 
affected residents. For that reason, the study is 
revealing financial disaster options taken by 
affected residents form flood. 
 
 (1) Withdrawing upon their savings 
   It is important to overview the house 
restoration cost before the financial options 
taken by household. As Table 3, the results of 
mean difference test (T-test) indicate that an 
average of house restoration cost excluding 
furniture in 2006 have significantly difference 
related to type of house construction. The 
non-pillar house owner was force to pay for 
house restoration at an average of 21,000 baht 
(61,764 Yen). While their neighbor, who 
owns a pillar house, paid at an average of 
8,142 baht (23,947 Yen). Noticeable, pillar 
house owners could handle with cost of house 
restoration easier than non-pillar house 
owners could deal with it because of lower 
house restoration cost.  
   The point was proved here that is whether 
affected residents can access to emergency 
finance as disaster relief or loan system, they 
still use their savings as the first reachable 
option for restoring their living condition and 
infrastructures that support them. The 
respondents reveal a reason of withdrawing 
their saving money in a previous flood 
because of negative change of income and 
added expense. They were in trouble in 
increased expense, while they had a sudden 
drop in income. It forced their consumption 
to rely on their savings or loan money, where 
they are unable to continue with their old 
means of livelihoods. Thereby it brings them 
to poverty cycle. 
  
Pillar House Non-Pillar House 
Figure 3: Type of House Construction In The Study Area 
 
Source: By Authors 
Table 2: Number of Respondents Shown 
 
Attributes House Construction 
Pillar 
Houses 
Non-Pillar 
Houses 
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 
in
co
m
e   6,000 Baht  3 3 
6,001 – 18,000 Baht  4 0 
 18,001 Baht  0 2 
 
Source: By Authors 
 
Table 3 : Average House Restoration Cost in 2006 
 Number 
of 
Respondents 
Mean of House 
Restoration 
Cost (Baht) 
Pillar House 7 (58.3%) 8,142 
Non-Pillar House 5 (41.5%) 20,000 
 
Source: By Authors 
 
 
Figure 4 :  Three groups of respondents identified based on their savings 
efficiency 
 
Source: By Authors 
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Table 4: Source of funds and its Covering Proportion Comparing with Total House Restoration Cost 
 
 
 
Financial instruments taken by flood victims 
(Average proportion of loan in each option compared with  
total restoration cost: Percent) 
The respondents live 
under poverty line 
The respondents live 
under average 
income 
The respondents 
live over average 
income 
Total respondents (families) 6 families 4 families 2 families 
So
ur
ce
 o
f F
un
ds
 
Commercial Bank Loaning System Na Na Na 
Saving Money 6 families (52.50%)  4 families (74.38%)  2 families 
(30.00%)  
Disaster Financial Assistance 
Contributed by Government 
2 families (47.50%)  2 families (21.25%)  1 family (30.00%)  
Welfare From Employer Na Na 1 family (50.00%)  
Cooperative Saving Project 1 family (50.00%)  Na Na 
Moneylenders 3 families (46.66%)  1 family (60.00%)  1 family (60.00%)  
 
Source: By Authors 
Note : (Percent)   = Average proportion of loan in each option compared with total restoration cost 
           Na             = None respondent was identified in the categories 
    
   As Table 4, financial options of low-income household are usually narrower and more climate-sensitive 
than those of the non-low-income. Low-income households are particularly vulnerable to deviations from 
average climate condition such as annual flood as their job usually rely on whether such as small shop 
owners and another self employment which cannot operate their shop to generate their income. Most of 
money spent during flooding is their saving money. Meanwhile, high-income household have more choice to 
mitigate their losses. They could take company welfare for financing recovery process, and they also could 
get income from thier employer.  
   Easy accessibility of financial instrument becomes a crucial factor for residents. Flood losses may be 
forced low-income residents borrow money from moneylenders who request 15-20 percent per month for 
loaning interest. We reclassified the respondents group from based on poverty line as shown in Table 4 to 
financial aptness base referred to their savings efficiency as illustrated in Figure 4.  
   As Figure 4, the results indentify that there are three groups of respondents based on their efficiency 
savings. The first group is respondents who did not prepare money for taking restoration activities after flood 
occurring. Although, All of twelve sampling prepared some money for spending in daily life during a flood, 
but six out of all sampling did not prepare savings for house restoration.  
   The mentioned six respondents took more than one financial option for satisfying their need. All of them 
did withdraw their savings and take at least another one financial option at the same time. Other sources of 
fund of this group are disaster relief, welfare from employer, cooperative saving project, and moneylenders. 
Unfortunately, three out of six respondents, who are low-income households living under poverty line, did 
not get financial support of disaster relief provided by government. Flood loss forced two of them borrowing 
approximately 46.66 percent of their house restoration cost from moneylenders who requested 15-20 percent 
of interest rate in return. The other one borrowed 50 percent of their house restoration cost from cooperative 
savings project for agriculturist. 
   The second group is respondents who prepared their own savings for spending in some part of house 
restoration activities. Four out of twelve is categorized to this group. All of them did withdraw their savings 
for covering their house restoration cost at an average of 36.25 percent of the total cost. Although, two out of 
four got financial support as disaster relief approximately 47.5 percent of total house restoration cost, but one 
out of two still needed more amount of money than supporting money provided by government. The 
respondent borrowed money to compensate their 40 percent of total house restoration cost shot. In fact, three 
on fourth respondents in this group took borrowing money from moneylender approximately 53.33 percent 
of total house restoration cost. 
   The third group is respondents who prepared their savings for taking any restoration activities, which is to 
recover their flood loss. There are only two respondents out of twelve respondents is identified to this group. 
Surprisingly, both of them are low-income household who earn income under the amount of average 
household income (Under 18,000 baht per mouth), and they are pillar house owner. The main reason why 
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low-income can handle with restoration cost is their pillar house have less costs of house restoration than 
non-pillar house. The respondents mentioned above could handle with total house restoration cost, which are 
5,000 baht and 6,000 baht. While house restoration cost for non-pillar house construction are higher than 
10,000 baht. Namely, non-pillar house owners got more financial serious problems in house restoration than 
pillar house owners. 
   Apparently, although government has been contributing disaster financial assistance for house restoration, 
but only four out of the respondents got the contribution. Moreover, disaster financial assistance did not 
cover all of restoration cost. In periods of stress, they may be forced to take another financial options in order 
to satisfy their needs such as loan with high interest rate, thereby it bring them to poverty cycle which of 
undermining the sustainability of their livelihood over the longer term. 
   We concerned with five out of twelve took moneylenders as major source of funds as shown in Table 4. 
The fact that two out of five are living upper poverty line and one of them is medium income household. The 
results stated that 50 percent of low-income households did borrow money from moneylenders trading with 
15-20 percent per month of interest rate in return. This statement can refer that informal loaning system has 
been gotten popularity among low-income residents and medium-income residents. 
 
 (2) Willingness to mitigate flood loss through Flood Microinsurance Program 
 
   The study introduced microinsurance 
scheme as a new financial option to the 
sampling for examining their needs, 
their attitude and their willingness to 
join in flood microinsurance program. 
The 12 respondents were asked about 
what extent they would like to join in 
optional insurance scenario. Four 
questions of optional insurance scenario 
are related to benefit-limitation of 
insurance in each insurance scheme. As 
Figure 5, the intensive degree of 
questions were started with willingness 
to join in flood insurance program, 
willingness to join in flood 
microinsurance, preference between 
Individual group based insurance 
policy, and willingness to join in 
microinsurance combination with 
microfinance as financial incentive. 
   The first question asked about respondents’ willingness to join in flood insurance program using premiums 
based on fire insurance policy of American International Insurance Company (AIA). Based on the question, 
the question the requested premium is started with annual cost at 4,834 baht per year for trading with 1.5 
million baht of coverage loss11.  The results found that none out of twelve respondents is willing to join in 
flood insurance policy. It is not surprising that the respondents would prefer to be non-insured over to be 
clients of insurance company as the premium cost is over 25 percent of their household’s monthly income. 
   The second question had provided information and advantage of flood microinsurance, neighborhood flood 
microinsurance comparing with traditional insurance before asked the questions of willingness to join in 
flood microinsurance. The provided information is shown as follow; firstly, microinsurance has escalator-
type of premium for keeping initial affordable premium for low-income households, which it is lower 
premiums than traditional insurance. Secondly, frequent and irregular payment is adapted to clients’ financial 
liquidity. The results indicate that eight out of twelve respondents are willing to participate in microinsurance 
policy. The result of in-depth interview reveals that sensitiveness in price and financial self-control problems 
are the crucial factors dominating their willingness. Furthermore, the numbers of independent member in 
family is determinant of willingness to join in microinsurance policy. However, there is not significantly 
correlation between number of total family’s member and willingness to join in microinsurance policy. In 
short, the residents who reside in large family with many independent members tend to be more willing to 
join in microinsurance than other groups. The study proves that income and house restoration cost are need 
 
 
Figure 5 : Four Questions Examining Willingness to Join  
in Each Flood Insurance Scheme 
 
Source: By Authors 
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of respondents to mitigate their loss through microinsurance. Ten out of twelve respondents reflect that they 
want to get indemnity in house restoration cost, and two of them are willing to get compensation for 
diminished monthly income as same as other two of all respondents expect from microinsurance.  
   The third question is asking about would respondents prefer neighborhood (group) flood microinsurance 
policy coming with the lowest premium cost scheme, or higher premiums of individual flood 
microinsurance. According to the survey, 58.3 percent or seven out of twelve respondents would prefer 
individual insurance scheme rather than group insurance scheme; though more than half (57.14 percent) of 
those have daily talking and  sharing risk information to their neighbors. To take preference of group 
insurance scheme into account, the study investigates the crucial factor influencing on willingness to join in 
group insurance scheme by correlation test. The surprising results of daily talking and sharing risk 
information among neighbors have significantly less leverage to persuade respondents to join in group 
insurance scheme. However, the crucial factor dominating preference of respondents in group insurance 
scheme is power of exchanging things and contribution among their neighbors, which can dominate 
respondents’ preference in group insurance scheme. Namely, respondent who often contribute to or got 
contribution from their neighbors tend to prefer group insurance scheme than non-contributor group.  
   The last question aims to convince four out of twelve respondents, who are not willing to join in 
microinsurance policy, to turn them in microinsurance policy. As the consequent of answer, the study set a 
hypothesis that financial incentives is one factor dominating willingness to join in microinsurance policy, 
financial incentives in term of microfinance (such as micro-credit and micro-saving) are offered to 
respondents for examining domination of financial incentives on willingness to join in microinsurance 
policy. As the survey, two of those respondents would be more willing to join in microinsurance policy, if it 
is microinsurance combination with microfinance. Moreover, the question was asked to eight out of twelve 
respondents who are willing to participate in microinsurance policy. Seven out of eight admitted financial 
incentives are one factor persuade them into participating in microinsurance policy.    
   The results can refer that respondents need to ensure in flood risk through participating in microinsurance 
policy as well as they need saving and loan system as basic financial need in the first priority. Thus, 
microinsurance combination with microfinance is presumably preferable financial instrument, which 
respondents would like to join in it.   
  
6. Conclusions 
 
   After flood occurring, affected household have to restore their lives and infrastructure that support them. 
Not only well-off exposure asset holders are in trouble, but also low-income households owning small 
properties are suffering in limited financial capacity for recovering themselves. However, attention in risk 
financing approaches has been increasing into account of microinsurance as a new market risk-transferring 
instrument coming with affordable premium, which can increase financial security of low-income residents 
to against residual flood risks. The furthermore crucial point is how to enable Thais low-income residents as 
well as other income class to mitigate their flood risk through flood microinsurance. Unfortunately, flood 
microinsurance and flood insurance are not available, and has never researched in Thailand. Thus, the study 
focuses on what do low-income residents need to mitigate flood loss thought microinsurance if it would 
exist. 
   In conclusion, the results of the study indicate that compensation for diminished monthly income and 
indemnity for house restoration cost are the things that respondents need. As respondents have character of 
low-income residents who are self-employment, they are more climate sensitive than another employee who 
works in organization or company.  Thereby, flood cause them become victim of income insecurity and 
underemployment. Clearly, the results indicated that eight out of twelve respondents would like to get 
compensation for diminished monthly income. Meanwhile, house restoration cost will become a problem of 
residents if flood occurs. As the results, although all respondents have some savings for spending in time of 
disaster, but only two out of them could completely handle with cost of restoration activities. In time of 
financial liquidity strain, many residents needed other financial options to support their house restoration 
cost. Easy accessibility of financial instrument became a crucial factor for residents. Five out of twelve 
respondents admitted that they borrowed money from moneylenders trading with 15-20 percent per month 
for loaning interest in retune. 
   As a final point, microinsurance can play in indemnitor role to compensate flood loss instead of allow low-
income residents make a loan transaction with moneylenders. Five questions of interview model were 
established to identify respondents’ attitude and their willingness to join in microinsurance. As the results, 
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the tendency of preference in group insurance scheme of neighborhood flood microinsurance rather that 
individual insurance scheme is depended on neighborhood relationships in term of exchanging and 
contribution things among the neighbors. Meanwhile, respondents need to mitigate flood risk through 
microinsurance policy as well as they need saving and loan system in basic financial need. Thus, 
microinsurance combination with microfinance is probably an incentive to persuade residents participating in 
microinsurance policy, while enhancing neighborhood relationships in terms of exchanging things and 
contribution among the residents are the fundamental way to achieve the ultimate goals of neighborhood 
flood microinsurance. 
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